EDITABLE AUTHOR ORIGINAL
GLOBAL CORRUPTION Law, Theory & Practice
third Edition
GERRY FERGUSON
GERRY FERGUSON
 
Law
Add to cart
GLOBAL CORRUPTION Law, Theory & Practice

This book has been specifically created to make it easier for professors to offer a law school course on global corruption. It is issued under a creative commons license and can be used for free in whole or in part for non-commercial purposes. The first chapter sets out the general context of global corruption: its nature and extent, and some views on its historical, social, economic and political dimensions. Each subsequent chapter sets out international standards and requirements in respect to combating corruption – mainly in the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the OECD Bribery of Foreign Officials Convention (OECD Convention). The laws of the United States and United Kingdom are then set out as examples of how those Convention standards and requirements are met in two influential jurisdictions. Finally, the law of Canada is set out. Thus, a professor from Africa, Australia, New Zealand or English speaking countries in Asia and Europe has a nearly complete coursebook – for example, that professor can delete the Canadian sections of this book and insert the law and practices of his or her home country in their place. While primarily directed to a law school course on global corruption, this book will be of interest and use to professors teaching courses on corruption from other academic disciplines and to lawyers and other anti-corruption practitioners.

Conditions of Use

This book is released under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial-Share Alike 4.0 license (CC-BY-NC-SA). See creativecommons.org/ for more information. This book, or parts of it, may be reproduced for non-commercial purposes, provided that proper attribution is given to the original author. Ferguson, Gerry. (2018). Global corruption: Law, theory & practice. Victoria, BC: University of Victoria. To obtain permission for uses beyond those outlined in the Creative Commons license, please contact Gerry Ferguson at gferguso@uvic.ca.

Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
CC BY-NC-SA

About the Contributors

Gerry Ferguson is a University of Victoria Distinguished Professor of Law who specializes in criminal law. He is also a senior associate with the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy in Vancouver. Professor Ferguson is a member of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Anti-Corruption Academic Development Initiative (ACAD) devoted to the creation of anti-corruption academic materials and the teaching of university courses on global corruption. He is co-editor and co-author (with Douglas Johnston) of Asia-Pacific Legal Development (UBC Press, 1998), was a co-leader of the CIDA-funded Canada-Vietnamese Legislative Drafting and Management Program, 1994-95, and a team member of the CIDA-funded Canada-China Procuratoracy Project, 2003-2008, under the direction of the ICCLR. He is the co-author, with Justice Dambrot, of the annually updated two-volume book, Canadian Criminal Jury Instructions and co-author of the Annual Review of Criminal Law. Professor Ferguson has taught criminal law as a Visiting Professor at the University of Hong Kong, the University of Auckland, Monash University, the University of Malaya and the University of Airlangga in Indonesia. He has given guest lectures at various law schools in South Africa, China, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and Europe. Professor Ferguson is a former member of the National Advisory Council of the Law Commission of Canada and an active participant in the Canadian Bar Association, Law Society, and Continuing Legal Education Society activities. His teaching and scholarly interests include transnational and comparative criminal law and procedure, sentencing and mental health law.

Table Of Contents
  • Introduction - INTRODUCTION
    • IMAGE CREDITS
    • SPONSORS
    • TABLE OF ACRONYMS
    • ABOUT THE AUTHOR
    • PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • Chapter One - CORRUPTION IN CONTEXT: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
    • 1.1 - WHY CORRUPTION MATTERS: THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION
      • 1.1.1 - A Case Illustration of the Impact of Corruption
      • 1.1.2 - Four Concerns about Corruption
      • 1.1.3 - Four Other Related Concerns about Corruption
      • 1.1.4 - Empirical Evidence on the Relationship between Corruption, Reduced Economic Growth and Poverty
      • 1.1.5 - Poverty and Corruption: A Growing Concern
    • 1.2 - THE MANY FACES OF CORRUPTION
      • 1.2.1 - No Universal Definition of Corruption
      • 1.2.2 - Imposing Western Definitions of Corruption Globally
      • 1.2.3 - The Prevalence of Corruption
    • 1.3 - DRIVERS OF CORRUPTION
    • 1.4 - PERCEPTIONS AND MEASUREMENTS OF CORRUPTION
      • 1.4.1 - Commonly-Cited Indexes of Corruption
      • 1.4.2 - Some Limitations Associated with Corruption Indexes Based on Perceptions
    • 1.5 - MORE ISSUES ON MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION
      • 1.5.1 - What is Corruption?
      • 1.5.2 - Which Countries Are Most Corrupt?
      • 1.5.3 - What are the Common Characteristics of Countries with High Corruption?
      • 1.5.4 - What is the Magnitude of Corruption?
      • 1.5.5 - Do Higher Wages for Bureaucrats Reduce Corruption?
      • 1.5.6 - Can Competition Reduce Corruption?
      • 1.5.7 - Why Have There Been So Few (Recent) Successful Attempts to Fight Corruption?
      • 1.5.8 - Does Corruption Adversely Affect Growth?
    • 1.6 - HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION LAWS
      • 1.6.1 - Early History from Antiquity to the OECD Convention in 1997
      • 1.6.2 - International Corruption Instruments Culminating in UNCAC (2005)
      • 1.6.3 - The Meaning and Effect of International Conventions
      • 1.6.4 - Development and Revision of National Laws Against Corruption
    • 1.7 - DIVERGENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS ON CORRUPTION
      • 1.7.1 - Libertarians, Cultural Ethnographers and Liberal Democrats
      • 1.7.2 - The Three Authority Systems: Traditional, Patrimonial and Rational-Legal
    • 1.8 - A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION
    • 1.9 - CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CORRUPTION
      • 1.9.1 - What is Corporate Social Responsibility?
      • 1.9.2 - How Did CSR Develop?
      • 1.9.3 - Some Current CSR Policies and Initiative
      • 1.9.4 - The Need for Increased Trust in Business
      • 1.9.5 - Concluding Note
    • 1.10 - SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF CORRUPTION: GOOD GOVERNANCE
      • 1.10.1 - Ten Lessons to Be Learned in Designing Anti-Corruption Initiatives
    • 1.11 - ANOTHER CASE STUDY: BAE ENGAGES IN LARGE-SCALE CORRUPTION IN SAUDI ARABIA
  • Chapter Two - BRIBERY AND OTHER CORRUPTION OFFENCES
    • 2.1 - INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
    • 2.2 - DOMESTIC BRIBERY
      • 2.2.1 - UNCAC
      • 2.2.2 - OECD Convention
      • 2.2.3 - US Law
      • 2.2.4 - UK Law
      • 2.2.5 - Canadian Law
    • 2.3 - BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS
      • 2.3.1 - UNCAC
      • 2.3.2 - OECD Convention
      • 2.3.3 - US Law
      • 2.3.4 - UK Law
      • 2.3.5 - Canadian Law
    • 2.4 - FACILITATION PAYMENTS AND THE OFFENCE OF BRIBERY
      • 2.4.1 - Arguments for and Against Facilitation Payments
      • 2.4.2 - Facilitation Payments and Culture
      • 2.4.3 - The Economic Utility of Facilitation Payments
      • 2.4.4 - UNCAC and OECD Convention
      • 2.4.5 - US Law
      • 2.4.6 - UK Law
      • 2.4.7 - Canadian Law
      • 2.4.8 - Eliminating Facilitation Payments
    • 2.5 - ACCOUNTING (BOOKS AND RECORDS) OFFENCES RELATED TO CORRUPTION
      • 2.5.1 - UNCAC
      • 2.5.2 - OECD Convention
      • 2.5.3 - US Law
      • 2.5.4 - UK Law
      • 2.5.5 - Canadian Law
    • 2.6 - APPENDIX 2.1
  • Chapter Three - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE SCOPE OF CORRUPTION OFFENCES
    • 3.1 - JURISDICTION: TO WHAT EXTENT CAN A STATE PROSECUTE BRIBERY OFFENCES COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS?
      • 3.1.1 - Overview
      • 3.1.2 - UNCAC
      • 3.1.3 - OECD Convention
      • 3.1.4 - Other International Anti-Corruption Instruments
      • 3.1.5 - Corporate Entities
      • 3.1.6 - Overview of OECD Countries Jurisdiction
      • 3.1.7 - US Law
      • 3.1.8 - UK Law
      • 3.1.9 - Canadian Law
      • 3.1.10 - Concerns with Expanded Jurisdiction
    • 3.2 - CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER COLLECTIVE ENTITIES
      • 3.2.1 - Introduction
      • 3.2.2 - UNCAC
      • 3.2.3 - OECD Convention
      • 3.2.4 - Overview of Corporate Liability in the 41 State Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
      • 3.2.5 - US Law
      • 3.2.6 - UK Law
      • 3.2.7 - Canadian Law
    • 3.3 - PARTY OR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
      • 3.3.1 - UNCAC
      • 3.3.2 - OECD Convention
      • 3.3.3 - US Law
      • 3.3.4 - UK Law
      • 3.3.5 - Canadian Law
    • 3.4 - INCHOATE OFFENCES
      • 3.4.1 - Attempts
      • 3.4.2 - Conspiracy
      • 3.4.3 - Incitement (or Solicitation)
  • Chapter Four - MONEY LAUNDERING
    • 4.1 - INTRODUCTION TO MONEY LAUNDERING
    • 4.2 - THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MONEY LAUNDERING
    • 4.3 - THE MOST COMMON METHODS OF MONEY LAUNDERING
      • 4.3.1 - Use of Corporate Vehicles and Trusts
      • 4.3.2 - Use of Gatekeepers
      • 4.3.3 - Use of Domestic Financial Institutions
      • 4.3.4 - Use of Nominees
      • 4.3.5 - Use of Cash
    • 4.4 - INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR PREVENTION AND CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
      • 4.4.1 - UNCAC
      • 4.4.2 - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
      • 4.4.3 - FATF Recommendations
    • 4.5 - STATE-LEVEL AML REGIMES: US, UK AND CANADA
      • 4.5.1 - Introduction to the Essential Elements of AML Regimes
      • 4.5.2 - Financial Intelligence Units
      • 4.5.3 - Regulation of Financial Institutions and Professionals
      • 4.5.4 - Money Laundering Offences
      • 4.5.5 - The Role of Legal Professionals
    • 4.6 - EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AML REGIMES
      • 4.6.1 - Introduction
      • 4.6.2 - The Basel AML Index
      • 4.6.3 - FATF Mutual Evaluations
      • 4.6.4 - Other Evaluations
      • 4.6.5 - Barriers to Creating Effective AML Measures
  • Chapter Five - ASSET RECOVERY AND MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
    • 5.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 5.2 - ASSET RECOVERY CONCEPTS AND TOOLS
      • 5.2.1 - Asset Recovery Steps
      • 5.2.2 - International Asset Recovery Agencies
      • 5.2.3 - State-Level Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)
      • 5.2.4 - Types of Tools for Asset Recovery
    • 5.3 - INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OBLIGATIONS
      • 5.3.1 - UNCAC
      • 5.3.2 - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
      • 5.3.3 - Other Instruments
    • 5.4 - STATE-LEVEL ASSET RECOVERY REGIMES
      • 5.4.1 - US
      • 5.4.2 - UK
      • 5.4.3 - Canada
      • 5.4.4 - A Typical Example of the Asset Recovery Process
    • 5.5 - EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSET RECOVERY REGIMES
      • 5.5.1 - Overview of Existing Data
      • 5.5.2 - Continuing Challenges to Effective Asset Recovery
      • 5.5.3 - Emerging Tools in Asset Recovery
    • 5.6 - INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS
      • 5.6.1 - Introduction to Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements
      • 5.6.2 - Legal Basis for MLA
      • 5.6.3 - Mutual Legal Assistance under UNCAC
      • 5.6.4 - Mutual Legal Assistance under OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
      • 5.6.5 - Request Processes and Procedures
      • 5.6.6 - Request Process in the United States
      • 5.6.7 - Request Process in the United Kingdom
      • 5.6.8 - Request Process in Canada
      • 5.6.9 - Request Process for Asia-Pacific Countries
      • 5.6.10 - Grounds for Refusal of Mutual Legal Assistance Request under UNCAC and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
      • 5.6.11 - Barriers to MLA
  • Chapter Six - INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
    • 6.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 6.2 - INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE CORRUPTION
      • 6.2.1 - Overview
      • 6.2.2 - UNCAC and OECD Provisions and Their Implementation by the US, UK and Canada
    • 6.3 - ENFORCEMENT BODIES
      • 6.3.1 - UNCAC and OECD Provisions
      • 6.3.2 - Varying Levels of Independence in Anti-Corruption Enforcement
      • 6.3.3 - Investigative and Prosecutorial Bodies
      • 6.3.4 - Cooperation Agreements between State Parties and between Enforcement Bodies
    • 6.4 - INVESTIGATING CORRUPTION: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
      • 6.4.1 - Sources of Internal Investigations
      • 6.4.2 - Internal Investigations by Corporations: Five Basic Steps
      • 6.4.3 - Sources of External Investigations
      • 6.4.4 - An Overview of the Essential Elements of an External Investigation
      • 6.4.5 - Investigation Strategy in Corruption Cases
      • 6.4.6 - Investigative Techniques
    • 6.5 - OVERVIEW OF DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS
      • 6.5.1 - Introduction
      • 6.5.2 - Criminal Options and Procedures
      • 6.5.3 - Civil Options and Procedures
      • 6.5.4 - Comparative Data on the Use of Different Remedies in Bribery of Foreign Officials
    • 6.6 - CHARGING POLICIES
      • 6.6.1 - US
      • 6.6.2 - UK
      • 6.6.3 - Canada
    • 6.7 - ISSUES OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
      • 6.7.1 - Parallel Proceedings
      • 6.7.2 - Risks of Parallel Proceedings
      • 6.7.3 - Approaches to Multijurisdictional Enforcement
  • Chapter Seven - CRIMINAL SENTENCES AND CIVIL SANCTIONS FOR CORRUPTION
    • 7.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 7.2 - UNCAC
    • 7.3 - OECD CONVENTION
    • 7.4 - US SENTENCING LAW
      • 7.4.1 - Federal Sentencing Guidelines
      • 7.4.2 - Sentencing Procedure and Guiding Principles
      • 7.4.3 - Specific Corruption Related Guidelines
      • 7.4.4 - Imposition of Fines
      • 7.4.5 - Sentencing Corporations and Other Organizations
      • 7.4.6 - FCPA Sentencing
      • 7.4.7 - Other Financial Consequences
      • 7.4.8 - Comments on FCPA Enforcement
    • 7.5 - UK SENTENCING LAW
      • 7.5.1 - General Principles of Sentencing
      • 7.5.2 - Sentencing Cases before the Bribery Act 2010
      • 7.5.3 - Sentences under the Bribery Act 2010 (Pre-Guidelines)
      • 7.5.4 - Sentencing Guidelines for Corruption-Related Offences by Human Offenders
      • 7.5.5 - Sentencing Guidelines for Corporate Offenders
      • 7.5.6 - Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the UK
    • 7.6 - CANADIAN SENTENCING LAW
      • 7.6.1 - Sentencing Principles in General
      • 7.6.2 - Sentencing Principles for Corporations and Other Organizations
      • 7.6.3 - Sentencing Cases for Domestic Corruption and Bribery
      • 7.6.4 - Sentencing Cases for Corruption and Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
    • 7.7 - CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
    • 7.8 - DEBARMENT AS A COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE OF A BRIBERY CONVICTION
      • 7.8.1 - UNCAC
      • 7.8.2 - OECD
      • 7.8.3 - The World Bank
      • 7.8.4 - US Law
      • 7.8.5 - UK Law
      • 7.8.6 - Canadian Law
      • 7.8.7 - Applicability of Integrity Provisions to Other Government Departments
    • 7.9 - DISQUALIFICATION AS COMPANY DIRECTOR
      • 7.9.1 - Introduction
      • 7.9.2 - US Law
      • 7.9.3 - UK Law
      • 7.9.4 - Canadian Law
    • 7.10 - MONITORSHIP ORDERS
      • 7.10.1 - UNCAC and OECD
      • 7.10.2 - US Law
      • 7.10.3 - UK Law
      • 7.10.4 - Canadian Law
    • 7.11 - NON-CONVICTION BASED FORFEITURE
    • 7.12 - CIVIL ACTIONS AND REMEDIES
    • 7.13 - INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
      • 7.13.1 - Introduction
      • 7.13.2 - International Arbitration Explained
      • 7.13.3 - Why Parties Agree to Arbitrate
      • 7.13.4 - Treatment of Allegations of Corruption in International Investment Arbitration
      • 7.13.5 - Conclusions: International Investment Arbitration and the Global Fight against Corruption
  • Chapter Eight - THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN ADVISING BUSINESS CLIENTS ON CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION ISSUES
    • 8.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 8.2 - ROLES OF LAWYERS IN BUSINESS
      • 8.2.1 - Multiple Roles
      • 8.2.2 - Who Is your Client?
      • 8.2.3 - In-House Counsel and External Counsel
      • 8.2.4 - The Lawyer as a Corporate Gatekeeper
    • 8.3 - LEGAL AND ETHICAL DUTIES OF LAWYERS
      • 8.3.1 - Conflicts of Interest
      • 8.3.2 - Duty to Not Advise or Assist in a Violation of the Law
      • 8.3.3 - The Duty of Confidentiality and Solicitor-Client Privilege
      • 8.3.4 - Solicitor-Client Privilege, Confidentiality and Reporting Wrongdoing
      • 8.3.5 - Duty to Know Your Customer
    • 8.4 - WHERE LAWYERS MIGHT ENCOUNTER CORRUPTION
    • 8.5 - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DUE DILIGENCE, ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS
    • 8.6 - ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
      • 8.6.1 - Introduction
      • 8.6.2 - International Framework for Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs
      • 8.6.3 - US Framework
      • 8.6.4 - UK Framework
      • 8.6.5 - Canadian Framework
      • 8.6.6 - Critiques of Compliance Programs
    • 8.7 - RISK ASSESSMENT
      • 8.7.1 - What is a Risk Assessment?
      • 8.7.2 - What Risk Areas Are Being Assessed?
      • 8.7.3 - Conducting an Effective Risk Assessment
      • 8.7.4 - US Law
      • 8.7.5 - UK Law
      • 8.7.6 - Canadian Law
    • 8.8 - DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
      • 8.8.1 - Third Party Intermediaries
      • 8.8.2 - Transparency Reporting Requirements in Extractive Industries
      • 8.8.3 - Mergers and Acquisitions
    • 8.9 - INTERNAL INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPTION
    • 8.10 - CORPORATE LAWYERS’ POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR A CLIENT’S CORRUPTION
      • 8.10.1 - Introduction
      • 8.10.2 - Criminal Liability
      • 8.10.3 - Accessory Liability in Civil Actions
      • 8.10.4 - Tort of Legal Malpractice
      • 8.10.5 - Shareholders’ or Beneficial Owners’ Actions Against the Corporation’s Lawyer
      • 8.10.6 - Lawyers’ Civil Liability under Securities Acts
  • Chapter Nine - PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
    • 9.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 9.2 - AN OVERVIEW OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
      • 9.2.1 - Conceptualizing “Conflict of Interest”
      • 9.2.2 - Enforcement Mechanisms: Historical Foundations and Contemporary Tensions
      • 9.2.3 - Political Culture and Conflicts of Interest
    • 9.3 - A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND NATIONAL REGIMES IN THE US, THE UK, AND CANADA
      • 9.3.1 - International Law, Standards and Guidelines
      • 9.3.2 - General Structure of National Conflict of Interest Regimes: Statutes, Policies and Guidelines
      • 9.3.3 - General Structure of National Conflict of Interest Regimes: Bodies of Authority
      • 9.3.4 - The Substance and Interpretation of National Conflict of Interest Rules
    • 9.4 - CONCLUSION
  • Chapter Ten - REGULATION OF LOBBYING
    • 10.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 10.2 - TERMINOLOGY
      • 10.2.1 - Defining Lobbying
      • 10.2.2 - Terminology in a Comparative Context
    • 10.3 - LOBBYING AND DEMOCRACY
      • 10.3.1 - Democracy as an Indicator of Transparency
    • 10.4 - REGULATORY SCHEMES
      • 10.4.1 - Lobbying and the Broader Regulatory Framework
      • 10.4.2 - Principles of Lobbying Regulation
    • 10.5 - COMPARATIVE SUMMARY
    • 10.6 - REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT FOR LOBBYING
      • 10.6.1 - US: Framework and Context
      • 10.6.2 - UK: Framework and Context
      • 10.6.3 - Canada: Framework and Context
    • 10.7 - MAIN ELEMENTS OF LOBBYING REGULATION
      • 10.7.1 - Definition of Government Officials
      • 10.7.2 - Definition of Lobbyist
      • 10.7.3 - Definition of Lobbying Activity
      • 10.7.4 - Exclusions from the Definitions of Lobbyist and Lobbying Activities
      • 10.7.5 - Disclosure Requirements
      • 10.7.6 - Codes of Conduct
      • 10.7.7 - Compliance and Enforcement
    • 10.8 - COMPARISON WITH LOBBYING REGULATION IN EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
    • 10.9 - CONCLUSION
  • Chapter Eleven - CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
    • 11.1 - INTRODUCTION
      • 11.1.1 - Adverse Consequences of Corruption in Public Procurement
      • 11.1.2 - How Much Money Is Spent on Public Procurement?
      • 11.1.3 - Public Procurement Corruption within Developed Countries
      • 11.1.4 - The Importance of Maintaining a Low-Risk Environment
    • 11.2 - RISKS AND STAGES OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
      • 11.2.1 - Risk of Corruption by Industry and Sector
      • 11.2.2 - Stages and Opportunities for Procurement Corruption
      • 11.2.3 - Corrupt Procurement Offences
    • 11.3 - TYPES OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: P3S, SOLE SOURCING AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING
      • 11.3.1 - P3s
      • 11.3.2 - Sole Sourcing
      • 11.3.3 - Competitive Bidding
    • 11.4 - HALLMARKS OF A GOOD PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
      • 11.4.1 - Transparency
      • 11.4.2 - Competition
      • 11.4.3 - Integrity
    • 11.5 - PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OF TENDERING FOR PUBLIC CONTRACTS
      • 11.5.1 - US Private Law
      • 11.5.2 - UK Private Law
      • 11.5.3 - Canadian Private Law
    • 11.6 - PUBLIC LAW FRAMEWORK
      • 11.6.1 - International Legal Instruments
      • 11.6.2 - US Law and Procedures
      • 11.6.3 - UK Law and Procedures
      • 11.6.4 - Canadian Law and Procedures
    • 11.7 - EVALUATION OF PROCUREMENT LAWS AND PROCEDURES
      • 11.7.1 - OECD Review of Country Compliance
      • 11.7.2 - Other Procurement Issues and Concerns
  • Chapter Twelve - WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
    • 12.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 12.2 - WHAT IS WHISTLEBLOWING?
    • 12.3 - INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
      • 12.3.1 - UNCAC
      • 12.3.2 - The OECD Convention
      • 12.3.3 - Other Regional Conventions and Agreements
    • 12.4 - “BEST PRACTICES” IN WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION LEGISLATION
      • 12.4.1 - Limitations of Best Practices
      • 12.4.2 - Sources for Best Practices
      • 12.4.3 - General Characteristics of Best Practices
    • 12.5 - WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE US: A PATCHWORK OF LEGISLATION
      • 12.5.1 - Whistleblower Protection in the Public Sector
      • 12.5.2 - Encouraging Whistleblowing through Rewards: The False Claims Act
      • 12.5.3 - A Brief Discussion of Federal Whistleblowing Protection in the Private Sector
    • 12.6 - WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN THE UK: PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE ACT 1998
    • 12.7 - WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN CANADA
      • 12.7.1 - The Development of the Common Law Defence
      • 12.7.2 - Federal Legislation: The Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act
      • 12.7.3 - Securities Regulation in Canada: The Ontario Securities Commission Whistleblower Program
    • 12.8 - CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
  • Chapter Thirteen - CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS: CONTROLLING THE RISKS OF CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC CYNICISM
    • 13.1 - INTRODUCTION
    • 13.2 - HOW ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ARE FINANCED
      • 13.2.1 - Direct Contributions or Loans to Candidates and Political Parties
      • 13.2.2 - Public Funding
      • 13.2.3 - Independent Expenditures by Third Parties
      • 13.2.4 - Self-funding
    • 13.3 - OVERVIEW OF TYPES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
      • 13.3.1 - Transparency Requirements
      • 13.3.2 - Spending and Contribution Limits
      • 13.3.3 - Public Funding
    • 13.4 - RATIONALES FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
      • 13.4.1 - Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
      • 13.4.2 - Equality, Fairness, and Participation
      • 13.4.3 - Informed Voting
      • 13.4.4 - Public Confidence
      • 13.4.5 - Other Rationales
    • 13.5 - OVERVIEW OF CHALLENGES IN REGULATING CAMPAIGN FINANCE
      • 13.5.1 - Freedom of Expression and Association
      • 13.5.2 - Entrenching Incumbents and Differential Impacts on Different Political Parties
      • 13.5.3 - Loopholes
      • 13.5.4 - Circumscribing the Scope of Regulated Activities
      • 13.5.5 - New Campaigning Techniques
    • 13.6 - THE REGULATION OF THIRD-PARTY CAMPAIGNERS
      • 13.6.1 - The Role of Third-Party Campaigners
      • 13.6.2 - Regulating Third-Party Campaigners to Reinforce other Campaign Finance Controls
      • 13.6.3 - The Regulation of Third Parties and Freedom of Speech
      • 13.6.4 - Third-Party Spending and Corruption
      • 13.6.5 - The Regulation of Institutional Third Parties
      • 13.6.6 - Incidence of Third-Party Electioneering in Canada and the UK
    • 13.7 - INTERNATIONAL LAW
    • 13.8 - US LAW
      • 13.8.1 - Constitutional Rights and Campaign Finance Regulation in the US
      • 13.8.2 - Regulatory Regime in the US
      • 13.8.3 - Criticisms of Campaign Finance Regulation in the US
    • 13.9 - UK LAW
      • 13.9.1 - Freedom of Expression and Campaign Finance Regulation in the UK
      • 13.9.2 - Regulatory Regime in the UK
      • 13.9.3 - Criticisms of Campaign Finance Regulation in the UK
    • 13.10 - CANADIAN LAW
      • 13.10.1 - Constitutional Rights and Campaign Finance Regulation in Canada
      • 13.10.2 - Regulatory Regime in Canada
      • 13.10.3 - Criticisms of Campaign Finance Regulation in Canada
    • 13.11 - CONCLUSION

$0.00